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Unfair Trade Practices and Section 337Promises and Uncertainties
by Donald E. deKieffer*
David A. Hartquist**
I. Legislative History of Section 337
A. The Trade Act of 19741 left unchanged the substantive aspects
of section 3372 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337 makes unlawful
"unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer,
consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to
destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of
such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in
the United States ...
" However, the Trade Act introduced important
procedural changes which breathe new vitality into the substantive
rights created by section 337. For many years used virtually only in
international patent cases, section 337 could, as amended, provide a
viable remedy for redressing unfair trade practices in non-patent cases.
Whether this desired result will be achieved is the subject of this
article.
A glance at the pre-1974 application of section 337 is all that is
necessary to understand the potential significance of the Trade Act
amendments. Although the language of section 337 parallels the
prohibitions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, a peculiar twist in
judicial construction early in the history of the section made the
provision applicable almost exclusively in patent cases. This occurred
even though there is no indication in its legislative history that anyone
associated with passage of the section ever contemplated so narrow an
application. 3 The new procedural provisions added to the section were
intended to broaden the scope of the law beyond its traditional
application to patent cases. Thus, the range of section 337 apparently
incorporates the entire range of antitrust violations including preda*Member of the District of Columbia Bar; partner, Collier, Shannon, Rill, Edwards and
Scott, Washington, D.C.
**Member of the District of Columbia, California and U.S. Supreme Court Bars;
partner, Collier, Shannon, Rill, Edwards and Scott, Washington, D.C.
I Trade Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, § 1, codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2101 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
2 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(e) (Supp. 1975)).
3 Fisher, Protection Against Unfair Foreign Competition: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 158, 160 (1972).
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tory pricing, 4 refusal to deal, 5 conspiracy in restraint of trade, 6 pricefixing,7 monopolization 8 and market division 9 as well as certain types
of subsidization 10 and dumping. 11 However, latent scope of the law is
one thing; its realization is quite another. While the final results are not
yet in, the first two years' experience with enforcement of section 337
have been disappointing.
B. Major changes made by the Trade Act of 1974 as they affect non-patent
cases
a. The Trade Act authorized the International Trade Commission
[ITC] to order the exclusion of articles involved in unfair trade
practices. Under prior law, the Secretary of the Treasury, at the
direction of the President of the United States, was permitted to
exclude articles. 12 Under current law the ITC can authorize exclusion of
articles in all cases under section 337, whether patent or non-patent
cases. The President has the authority to disapprove a determination of
the ITC within sixty days after receiving notice of the determination. If
he does not disapprove the determination, or if he notifies the
Commission of his approval, the determination becomes final on the
day after the close of the sixty-day period or on the day that the
President notifies the Commission of his approval, as the case may be.
The President has no authority to reverse or revise the Commission's
finding of a violation of the statute; 13 he is merely empowered to
prevent enforcement of the statutory remedy.
b. As an alternative to issuing exclusionary orders, the Commission may issue cease and desist orders against any person violating, or
believed to be violating, this section. 14 If the offender fails to comply
with the cease and desist order, the Commission may then order
exclusion of the articles concerned.
c. New time limits have been established for action by the
Commission in section 337 cases. The ITC must complete its investigation and make its determination at the earliest practicable time, but not
later than one year, or eighteen months in more complicated cases,
after the date on which notice of the investigation is published in the
4 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
Id. § 14.
6
Id. § 1.
Id.
8 Id. § 1-2.
9
Id. § 1.
10 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
11 Id. § 160.
12 TariffAct of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (currentversion at 19 U. S.C.
§ 1337(e) (Supp. 1975) ).
13 S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 7186, 7331-32. [Such a finding would, of course, be subject to
judicial review.]
14 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (Supp. 1975).
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Federal Register. Is However, these time limits may be illusory due to
the loopholes incorporated in the Act. First, there is no statutory limit
on the amount of time which can elapse between the date a complaint
is filed and the date on which notice of investigation must appear in
the Federal Register. The ITC can literally give itself more time by
stalling its "official notice" while conducting an unofficial investigation
in the interim period. Secondly, by exercising its discretion to suspend
an entire investigation where other agencies or United States courts are
concurrently considering similar questions on the same subject matter,
the Commission may "stop the clock" on the twelve or eighteen-month
investigation periods.
d. Under section 337(e), the ITC has the authority to temporarily
exclude articles from entry during the course of an investigation if it
finds reason to believe that a violation of the section exists. However,
the Commission may decide not to exercise this authority after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production
of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers. The Commission directs exclusion from entry by
notifying the Secretary of the Treasury, who then must refuse entry of
such articles, except under bond. This is similar to the procedure under
prior law, except that now the Commission, rather than the Secretary
of the Treasury, has the authority to set bond.
e. Any exclusion from entry pursuant to a cease and desist order
under section 337 continues in effect until the Commission finds, and
in the case of exclusion from entry notifies the Secretary of the
Treasury, that the conditions which led to the order or the exclusion
from entry no longer exist and that therefore the exclusion or order is
17
no longer necessary.
f. The Trade Act clarified prior uncertainty with respect to the
availability of defenses in such cases. Section 337(c) provides specifically that, "all legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all
cases."
g. The Commission is required to consult with other departments
and agencies during the course of each investigation of section 337
cases. Specifically, the Commission must consult with and seek advice
and information from the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission,
and such other departments and agencies as it considers appropriate.18
h. Whenever, in the course of an investigation under section 337,
the Commission has reason to believe, based on information before it,
15 Id. § 1337(b)(1).
16 Id.

17 Id. § 1337(h).
18 Id. § 1337(b)(2).
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that the matter may come within the purview of section 303 (countervailing duties) 19 or of the Antidumping Act of 1921,20 the Commission
must notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that action may be taken as
is otherwise authorized by such section and such Act. 21 There is
considerable controversy as to the impact of this section on the
jurisdiction of the International Trade Commission.
II. Historical Use of Section 337 in Non-Patent Trade Cases Prior to
The Trade Act
Prior to the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, there were only two
non-patent trade cases reported by the International Trade Commission under section 337. The first case, reported in 1966, involved
watches, watch movements and watch parts. 22 Elgin National Watch
Company and Hamilton Watch Company alleged a combination and
conspiracy, furthered by a variety of acts and practices, to restrain and
monopolize United States trade and commerce in jeweled-lever
watches, watch movements and watch parts. The complaint alleged
that various United States importers and Swiss watchmaking industry
organizations were engaged in activities in violation of section 337.
During an investigation, the Commission searched for but failed to
find unfair methods of competition or unfair acts in the importation or
sale of the items in question, the effect or tendency of which was to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States. Many
of the acts and practices alleged in the Elgin-Hamilton complaint had
earlier been alleged by the Department of Justice in a civil action
involving substantially the same parties under section 1 of the Sherman Act 23 and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. 24 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York had determined
that the two Acts had been violated and the court issued an order
enjoining the defendants from acting further in pursuit of the combination and conspiracy. 25 The defendants were also required to renounce
undertakings which unreasonably restrained United States manufacture, imports, exports, or sale of watches, watch parts or watch making
machinery. 26

1919 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
20 Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
21 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. 1975).
22
U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION PUB. No. 177, WATCHES, WATCH MOVEMENTS, AND WATCH
PARTS, Investigation No. 337-19 (June 1966).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
24 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970).
25 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, et al., [1963]
1 TRADE REG. REP. 70,600.
26 Id.
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The Commission, in refusing to recommend that the President
issue an exclusionary order, stated that:
Had the order of the U.S. District Court not intervened in the
period before the institution of the Commission's investigation and
after the acts and practices on the basis of which the Court found
violation of the Sherman and Wilson acts, the issues before the
Commission might have been different. Section 337, however,
does not provide for refusal from entry in perpetuity, but only until
the President finds that the conditions which led to such refusal
from entry no longer exists. Therefore, and because the intervening order of the court was followed by corrective measures taken in
compliance therewith, the Commission has confirmed its conclusions generally to the circumstances extant after the court's final
order. 27
However, the Commission finding was that the respondents were
not "currently engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair acts
in the importation of watches, watch movements, or watch parts into
the United States' or in their sale, of sufficient viability to bring them
within the proscriptions of section 337 and the application of its
sanction." 28 In describing the rationale for its findings, the Commission pointed out that section 337 does not restrict the freedom of
foreign companies to operate as they please overseas. Only if trade and
commerce in the United States is affected does section 337 come into
play:
The existence of such an arrangement of foreign producers,
the products of which enter in and are sold in substantial amount
in the United States, does not per se establish a violation of the
provisions of section 337. The provisions of section 337 do not
inhibit the freedom of foreign concerns to organize themselves or
conduct their commercial operations in foreign countries (not
affecting trade and commerce in the United States) as they please
and as the applicable law permits. Nor does section 337 penalize
mere success in the United States domestic market. If, however, in
the importation or sale of articles such an organization imposes
unreasonable restraints upon trade and commerce in the United
States, or monopolizes such trade and commerce, or engages in
unfair methods of competition tending to so restrain or
monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, section 337
may be applicable. 29

The second non-patent trade case reported by the Commission
was the Tractor Parts case; it involved two separate findings. The first
report 30 recommended an exclusion order to remedy the alleged unfair
27

PARTS,

U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION PUB. No. 177, WATCHES, WATCH MOVEMENTS, AND WATCH

Investigation No. 337-19 (June 1966), at 8.

28

Id. at 10.

29

Id. at 13.

30

U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION PUB. No. 401, TRACTOR PARTS I, Investigation No. 337-22

(June 1971), at 6.
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trade practices (boycott). Six months following the original report, the
Commission issued a second report in the Tractor Parts case. 3 1 By a
vote of two to one, the Commission reversed its earlier recommendation that the President issue an order excluding certain tractor parts
from entry. The decisions were notable in that they both stressed the
Commission's broad antitrust jurisdiction. Commissioner Sutton,
speaking for the majority in the second report, found that while
violations of section 337 had occurred, the violations no longer existed.
Commissioner Sutton stated that,
Inasmuch as a violation of section 337 does not continue to exist in
this case, the public interest will not be served by the exclusion of
Berco tractor parts from entry into the United States. A different
situation might exist if section 337 provided, as a remedy, the
issuance against the conspirators of an order to cease and desist
from their illegal acts. Such an order would allow business to
continue, while also enjoying the continuation or resumption of
the unfair methods or acts; section 337, however, provides only for
an in rem action against the imported goods (i.e., exclusion from
the effect of terminatentry), and such action, if taken, would have
32
ing trade in the tractor parts in question.
As previously noted, Congress added cease and desist authority to
section 337 in the Trade Act of 1974.

III. Non-Patent Cases Following Enactment of Trade Act
a. Electronic Audio and Related Equipment: On July 10, 1973, District
Sound, Inc. filed a complaint with the ITC alleging inter alia that a
major Japanese stereo producer [JVC] refused to sell its products to
District Sound due to the latter's refusal to maintain minimum "fixed
prices" suggested by JVC. Almost three years later, the Commission
finally issued its decision. 33 The Commission concluded that JVC had
in fact refused to sell to District Sound, Inc., but that the refusal was
based upon District Sound's failure to provide reasonable merchandising facilities (a "sound room") required by the enfranchisement contract rather than upon a "conspiracy" alleged in the complaint. The
ultimate decision in District Sound was much less significant than the
method by which it was reached and the "ground rules" adopted by
the Commission. Following District Sound, there was little doubt about
what the Commission thought its legal scope of authority ought to be.
The allegations in District Sound were similar to those generally found
31

U.S.

TARIFF COMMISSION PUB.

No. 443,

TRACTOR PARTS II,

Investigation No.

337-22 (Dec. 1971).
32 Id. at 9.
33

U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, CERTAIN ELECTRONIC AUDIO AND RELATED

EQUIPMENT,

Investigation No. 339-TA-14, 41 Fed. Reg. 9010 (1976).
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in cases involving Section 1 of the Sherman Act 34 and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 35 The Commission's opinion is replete
with direct references to these provisions, and the Commission
adopted the entire antitrust lexicon to sustain its findings. No less than
twenty antitrust cases were cited as authority. Commissioner Minchew, author of the Recommended Determination, underscored this
point, referring with approval to Bart Fisher's 1972 article 3 6 noting:
... [T]he language contained in 337 echoes 'the antitrust semantics
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the unfair competition
admonitions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'
Not a single Commissioner expressed the slightest doubt that section
337 was, in fact, a virtual replacement for almost all the other major
American antitrust laws where international trade was even tangentially involved.
b. Color Television Sets: GTE Sylvania, Inc., filed a complaint on
January 15, 1976 (amended May 24, 1976) against thirteen respondents,
including both Japanese firms and United States subsidiaries of
Japanese companies. 37 Sylvania alleged that respondents were engaging in unfair and anticompetitive acts and practices individually, as
well as in furtherance of an unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of United States trade or commerce in the color
television industry and were engaging in a combination or conspiracy
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize such trade or commerce or
parts thereof, thereby causing substantial injury to the domestic
industry. Specifically, the Sylvania complaint alleged predatory pricing schemes under which Japanese companies import and sell color
television sets in the United States at prices below cost or at unreasonably low prices. The complaint also alleged that the respondents
receive certain incentives and other economic benefits from the
Japanese government which facilitate below cost pricing. The complaint noted that such incentives and other economic benefits do not
fall within the technical definitions of "bounties and grants" as set
forth in section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. 38 Even so,
Sylvania alleged, the receipt of such economic benefits constituted an
unfair method of competition. Additionally, the Japanese companies
allegedly received benefits from a government-industry partnership
alien to the United States system of free private enterprise. Among
other things, the Japanese color television market is, and always has
34 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
35 Id. § 45.
36

Fisher, supra note 3.

37 U.S.
SETS,

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Investigation No. 337-TA-23.

CERTAIN COLOR TELEVISION RECEIVING

38 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S. C.
§ 1303 (Supp. 1975) ).

114

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.

been, closed to competitors from the United States, according to the
complaint.
The color television case has given rise to substantial controversy
within the executive branch. The Departments of Treasury, State and
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission each wrote letters to the
International Trade Commission requesting that consideration of this
case be terminated and that the issues be turned over to the proper
departments and agencies. 3 9 The ITC administrative law judge hearing
the case ruled that the Commission, despite the opposition by other
agencies, did have jurisdiction over the case. 40 His decision was
immediately appealed both to the full Commission 4 1 and to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. The full Commission
ruled to retain jurisdiction over the case and directed its general
counsel to oppose the appeal in the District Court. 42 The District Court
upheld the ITC's jurisdiction. 43 However, when lawyers for GTE
Sylvania prepared to visit Japan to investigate Japanese business
practices, their visas were revoked. Significantly, their visit had been
specifically authorized by the "discovery" procedures of section 337.
When attorneys for Sylvania protested, and demanded they be given a
"judgment on the pleadings" since they were denied access to the
background material, counsel for the Japanese companies objected,
claiming they could not be held responsible for the acts of their
government. This was too much for the Commission, and in December, 1976, they suspended the GTE Sylvania proceeding. 44 However, on March 23, 1977, the Commission voted to reopen the investigation in regard to the alleged predatory pricing.
c. Chicory Root: The Chicory45 case was the first to allege a full range
of antitrust violations including price fixing, predatory pricing, refusals
to deal, restraint and monopoly on trade and commerce, and conspiracy in restraint of trade. Filed in June 1976, Chicory involved issues
clearly within the scope of Sherman (1) and (2).46 The complainant was
a New Orleans-based chicory producer which charged that its ex39 41 Fed. Reg. 55,948 (1976).
40 Determination Under Rule 210.60(b), Allowing Application for Review with
respect to his Ruling Denying Amended Motions to Terminate and Dismiss of July 12,
1976 (August 6, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 55,948 (1976).
41 Application for Review of Denial of Respondents' Motion to Terminate the
Proceedings and Dismiss the Complaint, International Trade Commission Motion No.
23-20 (August 6, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 55,948 (1976).
42 Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Motion 23-3A (November 8, 1976), 41
Fed. Reg. 55,948 (1976).
41 Melco Sales Inc. v. ITC, Action 76-1932 (November 15, 1976).
44 U.S. International Trade Commission Memorandum Opinion, Investigation
No. 337-TA-23 (December 20, 1976).

4S U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, CHICORY ROOT, CRUDE AND PREPARED,

Investigation No. 337-TA-27 (June 1976).
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
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president had conspired with European suppliers to fix prices in the
American market and had shared customer lists with competitors. It
was also charged that, following the ex-president's departure from the
company, European competitors refused to supply the complainant
with raw materials and dropped their own prices to artifically low
levels.
Complainant moved for a temporary exclusion order pursuant to
section 337(e). That section provides in pertinent part:
(e) Exclusion of Articles From Entry During Investigation Except
Under Bond - If, during the course of an investigation under this
section, the Commission determines that there is reason to believe
that there is a violation of this section, it may direct that the articles
concerned, imported by any person with respect to whom there is
reason to believe that such person is violating this section, be
excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
United States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be
excluded from entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary of
the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such
exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry, except
that such articles shall be entitled to entry under bond determined
by the Commission and prescribed by the Secretary.
On September 7, 1976, the Commission denied complainant's
motion, finding little merit in any of complainant's assertions. But
"little merit" must be viewed in terms of the standards adopted by the
Commission. Citing section 337(e), the decision observed "... [Tihe
Commission [must] make three determinations of findings before it
can find that temporary relief is appropriate.
(1) There is a reason to believe that there is a violation of section 337.
.(2) There is a need for temporary relief; and
(3) The public interest factors do not outweigh the need for
temporary relief." [emphasis supplied]
The Commission never reached criteria (2) and (3) in disposing of
the Chicory case. The entire decision rested upon the phrase "reason to
believe." The Commission's reasoning on this issue was circuitous.
First, the decision established an initial hurdle; the determination of
"reason to believe that there is a violation" involves both (a) finding a
reason to believe that there is an unfair method of competition or
unfair act; and (b) finding a reason to believe that there is the requisite
effect or tendency as a result of such unfair practice. Secondly, even
though the term "prima facie violation" never appears in the statute or
its legislative history, the Commission decided "reason to believe"
really meant proof of a prima facie case. Thirdly, a finding of a "prima
facie violation" according to the Chicory decision involves (a) seeking
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and considering responses, legal and equitable defenses, and information from alleged violators and interested parties; (b) holding a hearing
under the Administrative Procedure Act; (c) finding a preponderance
of the evidence demonstrating both a violation and injury.
All this would be only slightly peculiar were it not for the explicit
language of the legislative history of the act. The Senate Report of the
Committee on Finance states 4 7 "... when the Commission has reason
to believe during the course of an investigation under section 337, that
an article is offered or sought to be offered for entry in the United
States in violation of section 337, but the Commission does not have
sufficient information to establish to its satisfaction that the section is being
violated..." then the Commission may exclude the article from entry
until the conclusion of the investigation. [emphasis added] The Commission, seizing the phrase "to its satisfaction," has rewritten the
obvious intent of Congress. It apparently felt free to establish any
standards it wished in determining whether temporary exclusion
orders were justified.
In view of the vague language of the Act, and its legislative
history, it is unlikely that the Commission's criteria could be successfully challenged. It is certain, however, that the Commission was, and
is, straining to avoid making affirmative decisions under section 337.
IV. Uncertainty Regarding Scope of Section 337 and Jurisdiction of
International Trade Commission
Although the Commission was found to have jurisdiction in the
Sylvania case, many jurisdictional questions remain, as well as uncertainty concerning the scope of section 337. Some of these issues were
discussed in a panel before the International Trade Subcommittee and
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the American Bar Association on
December 10, 1976. Commissioner Daniel Minchew, now Chairman of
the ITC, stated that the Commission has jurisdiction over a case if the
following criteria are met:
(1) A domestic industry is prevented from being established or an
existing domestic industry is injured as a result of unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation or
sale of articles.
(2) Articles which are the subject of unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts are imported into the United States.
(3) Such articles are sold in the United States.
(4) The sale constitutes an unfair method of competition and
an unfair act.

47 S. REP. No. 93-1298, supra note 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 7186, 7330.
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Interestingly, Commissioner Minchew pointed out that in his
judgment the Commission may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction
following the filing of a complaint. He noted that under section
337(b)(1), the Commission "shall investigate any alleged violation of
this section.. .". The statute is not discretionary with respect to
jurisdiction. If a complaint is in proper form, the Commission must
investigate and must make its determination within the time periods
provided.
Panel member David Clanton, Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission, argued that there must be a limit to the jurisdiction of the
International Trade Commission, particularly after goods have entered
the United States. Commissioner Clanton pointed out that the Trade
Act is directed at import situations. The ITC is clearly in a better
position than the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Department
to enforce judgments involving international trade. There should,
however, be some nexus to the importation of goods or the foreign
manufacture of goods giving rise to their importation into the United
States. After goods reach the United States, however, the Federal
Trade Commission is in a better position to deal with unfair trade
practices because of its procedures and because of its discretion with
respect to remedies. Clanton argued that the remedies in the-Trade Act
are extreme and may not be appropriate to the particular situation.
Commissioner Minchew also pointed out uncertainties as to what
constitutes unfair methods of competition or unfair act within the
context of section 337. The language "sounds like antitrust language,"
but the key question is whether the scope of section 337 extends
beyond traditional antitrust violations. In this regard, Douglas Rosenthal, Assistant Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, pointed out that section 337 seeks to
promote several values which may conflict with each other. First,
section 337 protects property rights. This may conflict with antitrust
interests if the property rights are being misused to restrain trade.
Secondly, section 337 protects industry from unfair foreign competition. Apparently, the section is designed to promote competition. In
contrast, it is not the purpose of the antitrust laws to help firms
survive but rather to promote competition. Unfair trade practices may
themselves constitute open and vigorous competition. Rosenthal expressed concern as to how far the Commission will go beyond
traditional antitrust jurisprudence. The International Trade Commission, he said, should not be "used" in cases brought in the guise of
encouraging competition but which actually constitute efforts to
thwart competition.
None of the panelists anticipated an effort to seek legislation
clarifying the jurisdiction of the respective agencies, but rather expected that such issues would be determined on a case-by-case basis.
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V. Conclusion
That the Commission has been unable to effectively handle nonpatent section 337 cases is a product of both the weakness of the law
itself and the inexperience of the ITC in antitrust matters. On its face,
section 337 is one of the broadest fair competition statutes ever written.
Unfortunately, passage of this section has raised more questions than
it has answered. Issues likely to arise upon enforcement of section 337
were never considered, much less answered, by the Congress when it
enacted this legislation. Unlike other "fair competition" statutes which
have libraries of precedent considering the meaning of virtually every
comma, the Commission has practically no guidelines to assist it in
administration of this section. This problem is further compounded by
statutory time limits for disposition of proceedings. While it would be
almost unthinkable for a major antitrust case in United States District
Court to be completed in anything under five years, the Commission
would be required to dispose of the identical proceeding in eighteen
48
months.
Finally, the Commission is ill-equipped to fulfill its statutory
responsibility. With a total staff of less than five hundred, the ITC has
only one administrative law judge, a general counsel's staff in excess of
thirty-five, and an investigative force of only two hundred to handle all
the Commission's functions. Few of the Commission employees have
any experience in complex antitrust legislation. It is unfair to expect
this agency to be capable of effectively administering the most sweeping antitrust law passed in the last quarter century. Until the law is
clarified and the Commission provided with the means to administer
it, section 337 will continue to be a legal quagmire.

48

See text accompanying note 15, supra.

